Recent work has shown that state-of-the-art classifiers are quite brittle, in the sense that a small adversarial change of an originally with high confidence correctly classified input leads to a wrong classification again with high confidence. This raises concerns that such classifiers are vulnerable to attacks and calls into question their usage in safety-critical systems. We show in this paper for the first time formal guarantees on the robustness of a classifier by giving instance-specific lower bounds on the norm of the input manipulation required to change the classifier decision. Based on this analysis we propose the Cross-Lipschitz regularization functional. We show that using this form of regularization in kernel methods resp. neural networks improves the robustness of the classifier without any loss in prediction performance.
Introduction
The problem of adversarial manipulation of classifiers has been addressed initially in the area of spam email detection, see e.g. [2, 10] . The goal of the spammer is to manipulate the spam email (the input of the classifier) in such a way that it is not detected by the classifier. In deep learning the problem was brought up in the seminal paper by [16] . They showed for state-of-the-art deep neural networks, that one can manipulate an originally correctly classified input image with a non-perceivable small transformation so that the classifier now misclassifies this image with high confidence, see [3] or Figure 4 for an illustration. This property calls into question the usage of neural networks and other classifiers showing this behavior in safety critical systems, as they are vulnerable to attacks. On the other hand this also shows that the concepts learned by a classifier are still quite far away from the visual perception of humans. Subsequent research has found fast ways to generate adversarial samples with high probability [3, 6] and suggested to use them during training as a form of data augmentation to gain more robustness. However, it turns out that the so-called adversarial training does not help as one can yet again construct adversarial examples for the final classifier. Interestingly, it has recently been shown that there exist universal adversarial changes which when applied lead, for every image, to a wrong classification with high probability [11] . While one needs access to the neural network model for the generation of adversarial changes, it has been shown that adversarial manipulations generalize across neural networks [12, 9, 8] , which means that neural network classifiers can be attacked even as a black-box method. The most extreme case has been shown recently [9] , where they attack the commercial system Clarifai, which is a black-box system as neither the underlying classifier nor the training data are known. Nevertheless, they could successfully generate adversarial images with an existing network and fool this commercial system. This emphasizes that there are indeed severe security issues with modern neural networks. While countermeasures have been proposed [4, 3, 17, 12, 6, 1] , none of them provides a guarantee of preventing this behavior. One might think that generative adversarial neural networks should be resistant to this problem, but it has recently been shown [7] that they can also be attacked by adversarial manipulation of input images.
In this paper we show for the first time instance-specific formal guarantees on the robustness of a classifier against adversarial manipulation. That means we provide lower bounds on the norm of the change of the input required to alter the classifier decision or said otherwise: we provide a guarantee that the classifier decision does not change in a certain ball around the considered instance. We exemplify our technique for two widely used family of classifiers: kernel methods and neural networks. Based on the analysis we propose a new regularization functional, which we call the Cross-Lipschitz Regularization. This regularization functional can be used in kernel methods and neural networks. We show that using Cross-Lipschitz regularization improves both the formal guarantees of the resulting classifier (lower bounds) as well as the change required for adversarial manipulation (upper bounds) while maintaining the prediction performance achievable with other forms of regularization. While there exist fast ways to generate adversarial samples [3, 6] , they do not take into account box constraints of the input e.g. as for images. We provide algorithms which generate adversarial samples satisfying box constraints in O(d log d), where d is the input dimension.
Formal Robustness Guarantees for Classifiers
In the following we consider the multi-class setting for K classes and d features where one has a classifier f :
We call a classifier robust at x if small changes of the input do not alter the decision. Formally, the problem can be described as follows [16] . Suppose that the classifier outputs class c for input x, that is f c (x) > f j (x) for j = c (we assume the decision is unique). The problem of generating an input x + δ such that the classifier decision changes, can be formulated as
where C is a constraint set specifying certain requirements on the generated input x + δ, e.g., an image has to be in [0, 1] d . Typically, the optimization problem (1) is non-convex and thus intractable. The so generated points x + δ are called adversarial samples. Depending on the p-norm the perturbations have different characteristics: for p = ∞ the perturbations are small and affect all features, whereas for p = 1 one gets sparse solutions up to the extreme case that only a single feature is changed. In [16] they used p = 2 which leads to more spread but still localized perturbations. The striking result of [16, 3] was that for most instances in computer vision datasets, the change δ necessary to alter the decision is astonishingly small. Already in [16] it is suggested to add the generated adversarial samples as a form of data augmentation during the training of neural networks in order to achieve robustness. This is denoted as adversarial training. Later on fast ways to approximately solve (1) were proposed in order to speed up the adversarial training process [3, 6] . However, in this way, given that the approximation is successful, that is arg max j f j (x + δ) = c, one gets just upper bounds on the perturbation necessary to change the classifier decision. Also it was noted early on, that the final classifier achieved by adversarial training is again vulnerable to adversarial samples [3] . Robust optimization has been suggested as a measure against adversarial manipulation [6, 14] which effectively boils down to adversarial training in practice. It is thus fair to say that up to date no mechanism exists which prevents the generation of adversarial samples.
In this paper we focus instead on robustness guarantees, that is we show that the classifier decision does not change in a small ball around the instance. Thus our guarantees hold for any method to generate adversarial samples or input transformations due to noise or sensor failure etc. Such formal guarantees are in our point of view absolutely necessary when a classifier becomes part of a safety-critical technical system such as autonomous driving. In the following we will first show how one can achieve such a guarantee and then explicitly derive bounds for kernel methods and neural networks.
Formal Robustness Guarantee against Adversarial Manipulation
The following guarantee holds for any classifier which is continuously differentiable with respect to the input in each output component. It is instance-specific and depends to some extent on the confidence in the decision, at least if we measure confidence by the relative difference f c (x) − max j =c f j (x) as it is typical for the cross-entropy loss and other multi-class losses. In the following we use the notation Let R > 0 be fixed and define q ∈ R with
Proof. By the main theorem of calculus, it holds that
Thus, in order to achieve
where the first inequality holds as f c (x) ≥ f j (x) for all j = 1, . . . , K and in the last step we have used Hölder inequality together with the fact that the q-norm is dual to the p-norm, where q is defined via
Thus the minimal norm of the change δ required to change the classifier decision from c to j satisfies
We upper bound the denominator over some fixed ball B p (x, R). Note that by doing this, we can only make assertions of perturbations δ ∈ B p (0, R) and thus the upper bound in the guarantee is at most R. It holds
Thus we get the lower bound for the minimal norm of the change δ required to change the classifier decision from c to j,
As we are interested in the worst case, we take the minimum over all j = c. Finally, the result implies that if δ p ≤ α, then the classifier decision cannot have changed.
Note that the bound requires in the denominator a bound on the local Lipschitz constant of all cross terms f c − f j , which we call local cross-Lipschitz constant in the following. However, we do not require to have a global bound. The problem with a global bound is that the ideal robust classifier is basically piecewise constant on larger regions with sharp transitions between the classes. However, the global Lipschitz constant would then just be influenced by the sharp transition zones and would not yield a good bound, whereas the local bound can adapt to regions where the classifier is approximately constant and then yield good guarantees. In [16] they suggested to study the global Lipschitz constant 1 of each f j , j = 1, . . . , K. A small global Lipschitz constant for all f j implies a good bound as
but the converse does not hold. As discussed below it turns out that our local estimates are significantly better than the suggested global estimates which implies also better robustness guarantees. In turn we want to emphasize that our bound is tight, that is the bound is attained, for linear classifiers
In Section 4 we refine this result for the case when the input is constrained to [0, 1] d . In general, it is possible to integrate constraints on the input by simply doing the maximum over the intersection of B p (x, R) with the constraint set e.g. [0, 1] d for gray-scale images.
Evaluation of the Bound for Kernel Methods
Next, we discuss how the bound can be evaluated for different classifier models. For simplicity we restrict ourselves to the case p = 2 (which implies q = 2) and leave the other cases to future work. We consider the class of kernel methods, that is the classifier has the form
where (x r ) n r=1 are the n training points, k : 
It has been reported that kernel methods with a Gaussian kernel are robust to noise. Thus we specialize now to this class, that is k(x, y) = e −γ x−y 2 2 . In this case
2 . We will now derive lower and upper bounds on this term uniformly over B 2 (x, R) which allows us to derive the guarantee. The Lipschitz constant L wrt to p-norm of a piecewise continuously differentiable function is given as
Proof. For the first part we use
where the last equality follows by Cauchy-Schwarz and noting that equality is attained as we maximize over the Euclidean unit ball. For the second part we consider
where in the second step we have separated direction and norm of the vector, optimization over the direction yields with Cauchy-Schwarz the result. Finally, the constrained convex one-dimensional optimization problem can be solved explicitly as α = min{
, R}. The proof of the other results follows analogously noting that
Using this lemma it is easy to derive the final result. , R and
Proof. We bound each term in the sum in Equation 3 separately using that ac While the bound leads to non-trivial estimates as seen in Section 5, the bound is not very tight. The reason is that the sum is bounded elementwise, which is quite pessimistic. We think that better bounds are possible but have to postpone this to future work.
Evaluation of the Bound for Neural Networks
We derive the bound for a neural network with one hidden layer. In principle, the technique we apply below can be used for arbitrary layers but the computational complexity increases rapidly. The problem is that in the directed network topology one has to consider almost each path separately to derive the bound. Let U be the number of hidden units and w, u are the weight matrices of the output resp. input layer. We assume that the activation function σ is continuously differentiable and assume that the derivative σ is monotonically increasing. Our prototype activation function we have in mind and which we use later on in the experiment is the differentiable approximation, σ α (x) = 1 α log(1 + e αx ) of the ReLU activation function σ ReLU (x) = max{0, x}. Note that lim α→∞ σ α (x) = σ ReLU (x) and σ α (x) = 1 1+e −αx . The output of the neural network can be written as
where for simplicity we omit any bias terms, but it is straightforward to consider also models with bias. A direct computation shows that
where u r ∈ R d is the r-th row of the weight matrix u ∈ R U ×d . The resulting bound is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2. Let σ be a continuously differentiable activation function with σ monotonically increasing. Define β rs
Proof. The proof is based on the fact that due the monotonicity of σ and with CauchySchwarz,
Similarly, one gets
The rest of the result follows by element-wise bounding the terms in the sum in Equation 4.
As discussed above the global Lipschitz bounds of the individual classifier outputs, see (2) , lead to an upper bound of our desired local cross-Lipschitz constant. In the experiments below our local bounds on the Lipschitz constant are on average 3 times, maximal up to 6 times smaller, than what one would achieve via the global Lipschitz bounds of [16] . This shows that their global approach is much too rough to get meaningful robustness guarantees.
The Cross-Lipschitz Regularization Functional
We have seen in Section 2 that if
is small and f c (x) − f j (x) is large, then we get good robustness guarantees. The latter property is typically already optimized in a multi-class loss function. We consider for all methods in this paper the cross-entropy loss so that the differences in the results only come from the chosen function class (kernel methods versus neural networks) and the chosen regularization functional. The cross-entropy loss
In the latter formulation it becomes apparent that the loss tries to make the difference f y (x) − f k (x) as large as possible for all k = 1, . . . , K.
As our goal are good robustness guarantees it is natural to consider a proxy of the quantity in (5) for regularization. We define the Cross-Lipschitz Regularization functional as
where the (
are the training points. The goal of this regularization functional is to make the differences of the classifier functions at the data points as constant as possible. In total by minimizing
over some function class we thus try to maximize f c (x i ) − f j (x i ) and at the same time
uniformly over all classes small. This automatically enforces robustness of the resulting classifier. It is important to note that this regularization functional is coherent with the loss as it shares the same degrees of freedom, that is adding the same function g to all outputs: f j (x) = f j (x) + g(x) leaves loss and regularization functional invariant. Note that this is not the case when one would penalize in the traditional way the derivatives of the classifier functions e.g.
Cross-Lipschitz Regularization in Kernel Methods
In kernel methods one uses typically the regularization functional induced by the kernel which is given as the squared norm of the function,
In particular, for translation invariant kernels one can make directly a connection to penalization of derivatives of the function f via the Fourier transform, see [13] . However, penalizing higher-order derivatives is irrelevant for achieving robustness. Given the kernel expansion of f , one can write the Cross-Lipschitz regularization function as
is a positive definite kernel for any x i and with the convex cross-entropy loss the learning problem in (7) is convex.
Cross-Lipschitz Regularization in Neural Networks
The standard way to regularize neural networks is weight decay; that is, the squared Euclidean norm of all weights is added to the objective. More recently dropout [15] , which can be seen as a form of stochastic regularization, has been introduced. Dropout can also be interpreted as a form of regularization of the weights [15, 5] . It is interesting to note that classical regularization functionals which penalize derivatives of the resulting classifier function are not typically used in deep learning. As noted above we restrict ourselves to one hidden layer neural networks to simplify notation, that is,
Then we can write the Cross-Lipschitz regularization as
u rl u sl which leads to an expression which can be fast evaluated using vectorization.
Box Constrained Adversarial Sample Generation
The main emphasis of this paper are robustness guarantees without resorting to particular ways how to generate adversarial samples. On the other hand while Theorem 2.1 gives lower bounds on the required input transformation, efficient ways to approximately solve the adversarial sample generation in (1) are helpful to get upper bounds on the required change. Upper bounds allow us to check how tight our derived lower bounds are. As all of our experiments will be concerned with images, it is reasonable that our adversarial samples are also images. However, up to our knowledge, the current main techniques to generate adversarial samples [3, 6] do not integrate box constraints. We provide in the following fast algorithms to generate adversarial samples which lie in [0, 1] d . The strategy is similar to [6] , where they use a linear approximation of the classifier functions to derive adversarial samples with respect to different norms. Formally, this means we do the linear approximation
Assuming that the linear approximation holds, the optimization problem (1) integrating box constraints for changing class c into j becomes
In order to get the minimal adversarial sample we have to solve this for all j = c and take the one with minimal δ p . Note that (8) is a convex optimization problem, which can be reduced to a one-parameter problem in the dual. This allows to derive the following result.
We start with problem for p = 2 which is given as:
x). If a solution of problem (9) exists, then it is given as
The optimal λ ≥ 0 can be obtained by solving
If Problem 9 is infeasible, then this equation has no solution for λ ≥ 0. In both the feasible and infeasible case the solution can be found in O(d log d). The algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
Proof. The Lagrangian is given by
The KKT conditions become
We deduce that if β r > 0 then α r = 0 which implies
Similarly, if α r > 0 then β r = 0 which implies
It follows
We can determine λ by inspecting v, δ which is given as
Note that λ ≥ 0 and 1 − x r ≥ 0 and thus −λv r > 1 − x r implies v r < 0, thus v r (1 − x r ) ≤ 0 and similarly −λv r < −x r implies v r > 0 and thus also −v r x r < 0. Note that the term v, δ is monotonically decreasing as λ is increasing. Thus one can sort max{ 
In total sorting takes time O(d log d) and solving for λ * has complexity O(d).
Next we consider the case p = 1. Proof. The result is basically obvious but we derive it formally. First of all we rewrite (10) as a linear program. 
Problem has no feasible solution end if
The Lagrangian of this problem is
Minimization of the Lagrangian over t resp. δ leads only to a non-trivial result if
We get the dual problem
sbj. to:
Using the equalities we can now simplify the problem by replacing α and using the fact that κ is not part of the object the positivity just induces an additional constraint. We get
Plugging this into the problem (16) we get max β,θ,γ,λ
We get the constraint β ≥ max{0, −λv − θ + γ} (all the inequalities and functions are taken here componentwise) and thus we can explicitly maximize over β
The maximum is attained if γ i − θ i − λv i = 0 resp. with the constraints on γ i , θ i this is equivalent to −1 ≤ λv i ≤ 1. Suppose that λv i > 1 then the maximum is attained for γ i = 1 and θ i = 0, and for λv i < −1 the maximum is attained for γ i = 0 and θ i = 1. Thus by solving explicitly for θ and γ we obtain max λ λvi>1
Note that the first two terms are decreasing with λ and the last term is increasing with λ. Let λ * be the optimum, then we have the following characterization
The cases |λv i | = 1 are undetermined but given that λ > 0 the remaining values can be fixed by solving for c = v, δ . The time complexity is again determined by the initial sorting step of O
(d log d). The following linear scan requires O(d).
Finally, we consider the case p = ∞. 
which is done in Algorithm 3.
Proof. We can rewrite the optimization problem into a linear program 
Algorithm 3
Computation of box-constrained adversarial samples wrt to · ∞ -norm.
Problem has no feasible solution end if
Experiments
The main emphasis of the experiments is the evaluation of the robustness of the resulting classifiers. We are not aiming at state-of-the-art results in terms of test error. In all the cases we compute the robustness guarantees from Theorem 2.1 (lower bound on the norm of the minimal change required to change the classifier decision), where we determine R by doing a small grid search, and adversarial samples with the algorithms from Section 4 (upper bound on the norm of the minimal change required to change the classifier decision). and ρ KNN40 is the mean of the 40 nearest neighbor distances on the training set and α ∈ {0.5, 1, 2, 4}. We show the results for MNIST when trained on the full training set of 60000 images and evaluated on the test set of 10000 images. However, we have checked that parameter selection using a subset of 50000 images from the training set and evaluating on the rest yields indeed the parameters which give the best test errors when trained on the full set. The regularization parameter is chosen in λ ∈ {10 −k |k ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8}} for Kernel-SVM and λ ∈ {10 −k | k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}} for our Kernel-CL. The results of the optimal parameters are given in the following table and the performance of all parameters is shown in Figure 1 . Note that due to the large computational complexity we could evaluate the robustness guarantees only for the optimal parameters. Cross-Lipschitz regularization achieves both better test error and robustness regarding adversarial sampling (larger is better) compared to the standard regularization. The robustness guarantee is weaker than for neural networks but this is most likely due to the relatively loose bound.
Neural Networks:
We use a one hidden layer network with 1024 hidden units and the softplus activation function with α = 10. Thus the resulting classifier is continuously differentiable. We compare three different regularization techniques: weight decay, dropout and our Cross-Lipschitz regularization. Training is done with SGD. For each method we have adapted the learning rate (two per method) and regularization parameters (4 per method) so that all methods achieve good performance. We do experiments for MNIST and CIFAR10 in three settings: plain, data augmentation and adversarial training. The exact settings of the parameters and the augmentation techniques are described below.The results for MNIST are shown in Figure 2 and the results for CIFAR10 are in Figure 3 .For MNIST there is a clear trend that our Cross-Lipschitz regularization improves the robustness of the resulting classifier while having competitive resp. better test error. It is surprising that data augmentation does not lead to more robust models. However, adversarial training improves the guarantees as well as adversarial resistance. For CIFAR10 the picture is mixed, our CL-Regularization performs well for the augmented task in test error but is not significantly better in its robustness behavior. The problem might be that the overall bad performance due to the simple model is preventing a better behavior. Data augmentation leads to better test error but the robustness guarantees are basically unchanged, but the adversarial resistance increases compared to the plain setting. Adversarial training slightly improves performance compared to the plain setting but negatively influences the robustness guarantees. We want to highlight that our guarantees (lower bounds) and the upper bounds from the adversarial samples are not too far away. For MNIST (all settings) the learning rate is for all methods chosen from {0.2, 0.5}. The regularization parameters for weight decay are chosen from {10 Illustration of adversarial samples: we take one test image from MNIST and apply the adversarial sampling technique from Section 4 wrt to the 2-norm to generate the adversarial samples for the different kernel methods and neural networks (plain setting). All classifiers change their originally correct decision to a "wrong" one. It is interesting to note that both kernel methods perform well, in the sense that the adversarial sample in both cases is not anymore a clear 9 and has really shifted towards a 4 (as predicted). This effect is strongest for our Kernel-CL, which also requires the strongest modification to generate an adversarial samples. The situation is different for neural networks, where the classifiers obtained from the three different regularization techniques are still vulnerable, as the adversarial sample is still clearly a 9 in all cases, even so our NN-CL requires the largest modification. Top left: original test image, for each classifier we generate the corresponding adversarial sample which changes the classifier decision (denoted as Pred). Note that for the kernel methods this new decision makes sense, whereas for all neural network models the change is so small that the new decision is clearly wrong.
Original, Class 7 K-SVM, Pred:9, δ 2 = 4.1 K-CL, Pred:9, δ 2 = 6.9
NN-WD, Pred:9, δ 2 = 1.7 NN-DO, Pred:9, δ 2 = 2.2 NN-CL, Pred:9, δ 2 = 2.4 Top left: original test image, for each classifier we generate the corresponding adversarial sample which changes the classifier decision (denoted as Pred). Note that for the kernel methods this new decision makes sense, whereas for all neural network models the change is so small that the new decision is clearly wrong.
Original, Class 5 K-SVM, Pred:3, δ 2 = 3.8 K-CL, Pred:6, δ 2 = 4.9
NN-WD, Pred:3, δ 2 = 1.5 NN-DO, Pred:3, δ 2 = 1.6 NN-CL, Pred:3, δ 2 = 2.3 Top left: original test image, for each classifier we generate the corresponding adversarial sample which changes the classifier decision (denoted as Pred). Note that for the kernel methods this new decision makes sense, whereas for all neural network models the change is so small that the new decision is clearly wrong.
Original, Class 7 K-SVM, Pred:9, δ 2 = 1.3 K-CL, Pred:9, δ 2 = 2.7 NN-WD, Pred:8, δ 2 = 0.7 NN-DO, Pred:9, δ 2 = 0.5 NN-CL, Pred:9, δ 2 = 0.8
Figure 12:
Top left: original test image, for each classifier we generate the corresponding adversarial sample which changes the classifier decision (denoted as Pred). Note that for the kernel methods this new decision makes sense, whereas for all neural network models the change is so small that the new decision is clearly wrong.
Original, Class 5 K-SVM, Pred:4, δ 2 = 1. Top left: original test image, for each classifier we generate the corresponding adversarial sample which changes the classifier decision (denoted as Pred). Note that for the kernel methods this new decision makes sense, whereas for all neural network models the change is so small that the new decision is clearly wrong.
Outlook
We think that formal guarantees on machine learning systems will become more important as they are used in safety-critical systems. This paper is a first step in this direction, but there remains much more work to do e.g. developing robust classifiers from scratch.
